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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Criminal Law-ENTRAPMENT-PREDISPOSITION OF DEFENDANT
CRUCIAL FACTOR IN ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)
Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are neces-
sary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.'
It is the Government's duty to prevent crime, not to promote
it. 2
With the increasing sophistication of organized crime's illegal
business enterprises and the ever-rising tide of drug related of-
fenses, infiltration and the use of undercover agents by law en-
forcement agencies may appear to be the only practical means of
detecting such criminal activities. However, law enforcement pro-
cedures which are inimical to a sense of justice and which threaten
to mislead and entangle innocent persons must be controlled in
order to safeguard individual liberty and maintain respect for law.
One method of controlling police conduct used by the federal
courts in criminal prosecutions is the affirmative defense of
entrapment.3 In implementing this defense, the courts attempt to
draw the line between permissible and impermissible police con-
duct by distinguishing between "the trap for the unwary innocent
and the trap for the unwary criminal. ' 4 However, considerable
controversy has been generated in the federal courts5 as to exactly
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
2 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 449 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
3 Although the defense is recognized in most states, a diversity of approaches is
followed. One commentator has surveyed the states to establish the pattern. See Comment,
The Doctrine of Entrapment and Its Application in Texas, 9 Sw. L.J. 456, 465 n.44 (1955). This
Note will seek only to clarify the federal approach.
4 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
5 Justice Frankfurter, critical of the approach taken by the majority of the Supreme
Court in Sherman, noted:
[T]he basis of this defense, affording guidance for its application in particular
circumstances, is as much in doubt today as it was when the defense was first
recognized over forty years ago, although entrapment has been the decisive issue in
many prosecutions. The lower courts have continued gropingly to express the
feeling of outrage at conduct of law enforcers that brought recognition of the
defense in the first instance, but without the formulated basis in reason that it is the
first duty of courts to construct for justifying and guiding emotion and instinct.
Id. at 378.
The commentators appear sharply divided on the status and proper direction of the law
on entrapment. See, e.g., DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History,
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where and how this line should be drawn. United States v. Russell6 is
the third and most recent attempt by the Supreme Court to clarify




Entrapment was first explicitly recognized in the federal courts
in Woo Wai v. United States.8 Confusion in the lower courts, how-
ever, as to the nature of the defense 9 led the Supreme Court to
render its first opinion on entrapment in Sorrells v. United
States'-a case which arose out of violations of the National Pro-
hibition Act."' A government agent, posing as a tourist, was intro-
duced to Sorrells by three acquaintances. By means of repeated
and persistent requests for liquor to "take back [home] . . . to a
friend"' 12 and by reference to mutual experiences as members of
the same division in World War I,' 3 the agent induced Sorrells to
procure one-half gallon of whiskey for him.1
4
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court,' 5 conceded that
government agents may afford opportunities or facilities for the
commission of an offense as part of the police weapons of stealth
and strategem necessary for the detection of certain types of
crime.' 6 In this case, however, police conduct went beyond permis-
sible limits. Here, "the criminal design originate[d] with the officials
of the Government. .. [who implanted] in the mind of an innocent
Theory, and Application, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 243 (1967); Donnelly, Judicial Control of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Note,
Entrapment: An Analysis of Disagreement, 45 BOSTON U.L. REv. 542 (1965); Note, The Defense of
Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 63 (1967).
6 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
7 The Supreme Court considered the defense earlier in its decisions in Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), and Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See
notes 10-52 and accompanying text infra.
8 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
9 See Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245,
245-50 (1942).
20 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
11 Id. at 438.
'2 Id. at 440.
13 Id. at 439.
24 Id. at 439-41.
I5 The Supreme Court split on the rationale underlying the entrapment defense. Four
justices agreed with the ChiefJustice's majority opinion, while three justices participated in a
strong concurring opinion. See notes 31-44 and accompanying text infra.
26 287 U.S. at 441. This concession has been the only noncontroversial area of the
courts' decisions on entrapment. See notes 25-52 and accompanying text infra.
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person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order that they [might] prosecute."'17 Such activities,
said the Court, constituted entrapment.
The Court's test in Sorrells was subjective, with emphasis on the
predisposition of the accused to commit the crime, although of
course, the conduct of government officials was relevant to a
consideration of circumstances surrounding commission of the
crime.' 8 Of special significance in Sorrells was the fact that the agent
had to repeat his request for liquor several times in the face of the
defendant's obvious reluctance to engage in the proscribed ac-
tivities. Furthermore, the government produced no evidence show-
ing that the defendant had been engaged in a continuing course of
liquor violations or had a past record of such conduct.' 9
The majority then provided the theoretical foundation for its
decision. Its finding of entrapment presented the Court with a
dilemma: how could it release a defendant who had clearly violated
a criminal statute? To do so would be to grant clemency, a power
reserved to the President.20 The Court avoided the difficulty by
statutory construction. It concluded that Congress could not have
intended to include an entrapped defendant's conduct as criminal
within the purview of the statute.2'
In Sherman v. United States,2 2 the Supreme Court considered
the entrapment defense a second time. As in many of the more
recent cases in which entrapment has been claimed, narcotics sales
were involved. 23 A government informer established a friendship
with Sherman through meetings in a doctor's office where both
went for treatment of narcotics addiction. After some discussion,
" 287 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
18 Presumably, the majority concluded that so long as a defendant was predisposed to
commit a crime, the likelihood of its commission was great enough even without police
interference.
In Sorrells, the concurring justices did not use this subjective rationale to justify a finding
of entrapment. See note 33 infra.
19 287 U.S. at 441.
20 Id. at 449.
21 Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this
statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the
instigation by Government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise
innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them. We are not
forced by the letter to do violence to the spirit and purpose of the statute.
Id. at 448.
22 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Privett, 443 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1971); Holloway v. United
States, 432 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1970); Perez v. United States, 421 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 59:546
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the informer asked the defendant if he knew of a good source of
narcotics. Although Sherman attempted to avoid the issue, the
informer persisted, allegedly because of the effects of the inade-
quate medical treatment he was receiving. Sherman finally relented
and obtained narcotics which he shared with the informer in
return for the cost of the drugs and his necessary incidental
expenses.24
In the majority opinion,25 Chief Justice Warren reaffirmed
and embellished the principles outlined in Sorrells.2 6 Predisposition
on the part of the accused remained the principal ingredient of the
test. Although the majority opinion first considered the govern-
ment informer's methods of inducement, appeals to friendship and
sympathy for the suffering of a fellow addict,17 it was only after a
careful evaluation of the evidence of the defendant's predisposition,
including his obvious reluctance to become involved and his at-
tempts to overcome his narcotics habit, that the Court reached its
conclusion that Sherman was entrapped. 28  Again the Court
adhered to the rationale that Congress could not have intended the
criminal law to apply to entrapment situations.2 9 The majority in
Sherman also made it clear that entrapment, as part of the factual
decision of guilt or innocence, is a jury question unless the evidence
is undisputed and so clear as to make out a case as a matter of
law.3 0
24 356 U.S. at 371.
25 As in Sorrells, there was a strong concurring opinion in Sherman. See note 31 infra.
26 356 U.S. at 372-73." The majority opinion quoted the basic Sorrells test with approval.
See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra. Chief Justice Warren then added gloss often
quoted in the lower courts:
Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was "the product of the creative
activity" of law-enforcement officials .... To determine whether entrapment has
been established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent
and the trap for the unwary criminal.... On the one hand, at trial the accused may
examine the conduct of the government agent; and on the other hand, the accused
will be subjected to an "appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and
predisposition" as bearing on his claim of innocence.
Id. at 372-73 (emphasis in original).
27 Id. at 373.
28 The majority opinion called two prior narcotics convictions insufficient without more
to show predisposition. Chief Justice Warren noted the defendant's hesitancy to comply with
the informer's request as well as his apparent attempts to overcome the narcotics habit.
Furthermore, no narcotics were found in a search of Sherman's apartment at the time of his
arrest nor had he made a profit on the sale of the drugs. Id. at 375.
29 Id. at 372.
" The Sherman court found entrapment as a matter of law by emphasizing that the
evidence of no predisposition was so strong that it was not "choosing between conflicting
witnesses, nor judging credibility." Id. at 373.
1974]
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II
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
The concurring justices in both Sorrells and Sherman31 were
justifiably troubled by the theoretical and pragmatic problems
inherent in an approach to entrapment which attempted to ascer-
tain the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. They
proposed a test which examined only the police conduct in a given
situation and determined whether such conduct would have in-
duced the average person to commit the crime.32 By ignoring the
predisposition of a particular defendant, the minority laid the
groundwork for an objective test 3 3 which could provide fairly
specific guidelines for law-enforcement officials34 while hopefully
3' The concurring opinions in Sorrells and Sherman, represent, respectively, the views of
Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and Stone and Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan, and
Brennan. The position of these justices has been popularly called the "minority view," the
"objective view," or the "police-conduct approach."
32 356 U.S. at 382; 287 U.S. at 458-59.
33 The approach of the concurring justices in Sorrells has often been called the
"objective approach" because it focuses solely on police conduct. The Sorrells majority
approach on the other hand has been commonly labelled the "subjective approach" because
it relies on a case-by-case determination of the predisposition of the accused. The majority's
test is subjective because the same course of police conduct could yield findings of both guilt
and innocence when applied to different defendants with differing degrees of predisposi-
tion.
A restatement of the subjective (majority) and objective (minority) tests, respectively,
would be: (1) Was the defendant in the present case and under the attendant circumstances
initially unwilling to commit the crime in question? (2) Would the average person have been
induced to commit the crime by the tactics used? Comment, Present and Suggested Limitations
on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforcement, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 261, 264
(1969).
31 Justice Frankfurter first called his view an objective one which could "give guidance
in regulating police conduct that is lacking when the reasonableness of police suspicions
must be judged or the criminal disposition of the defendant retrospectively appraised." 356
U.S. at 384. He noted that the standard could be developed only over time as new crimes
and methods of detection were considered by the courts. Id. The advantage would be a
growing body of precedent. Of course, creation of this standard would be possible only if
determinations were left to the court rather than to the jury. See note 41 infra.
One commentator has suggested six criteria by which to evaluate police conduct when
entrapment is claimed:
(1) appeals to a defendant's humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past
camaraderie; (2) temptation by exorbitant gain; (3) persistent solicitation in the face
of obvious reluctance; (4) the setting where the inducement was offered; (5) the
manner in which the particular criminal business is usually carried out; (6) the
secrecy and difficulty of detection of the crime.
Schecter, Police Procedure and the Accusatorial Principle, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 521, 527 (1967).
Cases illustrating proscribed police conduct can be categorized along similar lines. The
divisions are blurred, however, because the courts also considered predisposition in most of
the cases. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to list the types of police misconduct which may
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not unduly handicapping the prosecution. 35 Arguably, the subjec-
tive, majority approach allows the police added flexibility in dealing
with particular individuals, but the objective test would go far
toward enhancing equality of treatment under the law and dis-
couraging brinksmanship in police relations with recidivists. 36 As
Justice Frankfurter noted, "[p]ublic confidence in the fair and
honorable administration of justice, upon which ultimately de-
pends the rule of law, is the transcending value at stake. 37 By
focusing upon the predisposition of the defendant, the majority
give rise to a claim of entrapment: (1) appeals to friendship or past comradery (Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Walker v. United States, 285 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Kros, 296 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1969)); (2) appeals to sympathy to relieve
suffering, especially in narcotics cases (Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Kadis
v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967)); (3) use of persons especially close to
defendant (such as former mistress) in appeal for help (Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993
(5th Cir. 1933)); (4) appeals to one in serious financial difficulties (United States v.
Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1969); Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Dillet, 265 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)); (5) promises of
exorbitant gain (Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942)); (6) repeated and
persistent solicitation to a clearly reluctant victim (United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191
(3d Cir. 1957)); (7) threats of violence or bodily harm (United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d 1217
(3d Cir. 1972)); United States v. Lefner, 422 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1970)); (8) use of informers
or special agents paid on a contingent fee basis (Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965)); (9) government organizing or directing
plans for the crime, or providing necessary materials (United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671
(9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)). See Comment, Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1
U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 177, 179 (1967).
35 The Sherman majority had argued that adoption of the objective approach would
have unduly stifled government efforts at law enforcement.
Mr. Justice Roberts asserted that although the defendant could claim that the
Government had induced him to commit the crime, the Government could not
reply by showing that the defendant's criminal conduct was due to his own
readiness and not to the persuasion of government agents. The handicap thus
placed on the prosecution is obvious.
356 U.S. at 376-77. This criticism ignores the fact that the defendant would have to show
more than mere inducement under the objective test. He would have to show that police
conduct went beyond the limits of that which "would entrap only those ready and willing to
commit crime." Id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The average-predisposed-criminal
standard by which government conduct would be judged would substantially lessen any
handicap on the prosecution.
At least in the narcotics area, one survey has indicated that police views of behavior that
would constitute entrapment per se often were stricter than those of the courts. Bancroft,
Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of Entrapment: Device and Defense, 31 U.
CHI. L. REv. 137, 157 (1963).
The police-conduct approach would not disallow the use of strategem or informers. It
would merely establish an objective standard by which controls over some of the most
objectionable of law enforcement activities could be exercised. See generally P. TAPPAN,
CRIME, JUSTICE, AND CORRECTION 302-03 (1960).
36 See note 18supra and notes 39 & 42 infra.
37 356 U.S. at 380.
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approach implicitly precludes the equality of treatment upon which
the fair and honorable administration of justice depends-" In
allowing a bad reputation or prior criminal record to negate the ill
effects of some police conduct, the Court allows the greatest
latitude in objectionable behavior toward the weakest elements in
society, those least likely to be able to resist the temptation. 39
In addition to inequality, other difficulties of practical
38 judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933),
oulined three now famous criteria, proof of which would be considered to establish
predisposition: "[A]n existing course of similar criminal conduct; the accused's already
formed design to commit the crime or similar crimes; his willingness to do so, as evinced by
ready complaisance." Id. at 1008.
One commentator has noted that these criteria have expanded over the years.
Proof of an existing course of criminal conduct similar to the offense with which the
defendant is charged would logically demonstrate a predisposition. . . . The
defendant need not have been convicted for these prior offenses, nor need the
course of conduct be of the exact nature of the crime charged.
Note, Entrapment: An Analysis of Disagreement, supra note 5, at 552-53 (footnotes omitted).
Allowing predisposition to rest on charges of past offenses for which the defendant was
not convicted seems especially objectionable. The defendant in such a proceeding is put in a
weaker position merely because he was charged with a crime that he may not even have
committed.
39 [T]here is no intention to excuse persons who yield to temptation, or to hamper
or limit the acts of officers of the law in detecting crime by any means or device; but
the zeal to detect crime ought not to be so vigorous as to induce officers to originate
and procure the commission of the very offenses which they are enjoined to
prevent. No faithful officer of the law will be hampered, nor will any criminal be
aided by the observance of this rule. Its disregard, however, may, and likely will,
subject to persecution and conviction weak and spineless persons, who find it hard
to resist temptation; and the government, through the zeal for conviction..., may
become the means of the ruin of its citizens, instead of their safeguard and
protection.
United States v. Echols, 253 F. 862, 863 (S.D. Tex. 1918).
In addition, the majority approach, by allowing prior convictions to evidence predisposi-
tion, seems to ignore the goals of the criminal corrections system, which theoretically is
designed to rehabilitate offenders. Educational and vocational training in federal prisons is
oriented toward creating a new life-style for offenders. Job placement and supportive
programs for ex-offenders attempt to insure adjustment to a life away from crime. See TASK
FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 7 (1967).
Police tactics aimed at the ex-offender undermine this objective. They tend to break
down reintegration by appealing to former felons to return to crime. Government agents
and informers often attempt to rebuild broken underworld ties of one just released from
prison or to secure the return to narcotics addiction of one undergoing treatment. See
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Perez v. United States, 421 F.2d 462 (9th
Cir. 1970). Justice Frankfurter elaborated on the prejudice to criminal classes under a rule
which emphasized criminal disposition:
Permissible police activity does not vary according to the particular defendant
concerned; surely if two suspects have been solicited at the same time in the same
manner, one should not go to jail simply because he has been convicted before and
is said to have a criminal disposition.... A contrary view runs afoul of fundamental
principles of equality under law, and would espouse the notion that when dealing
with the criminal classes anything goes.
356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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significance arise under the majority approach in Sherman. One of
the most troubling aspects is the requirement that the issue of
entrapment be submitted to the jury.40 The problems attendant
with this requirement include a lack of precedential guide to law
enforcement agencies41 plus the high probability of prejudice to
the defendant when a jury considers the defense.42 Moreover,
40 Id. at 377. Chief Justice Warren listed a series of cases from courts of appeals which
followed the principle of jury submission, including a representative decision from each
circuit. Id. n.8. The concurring justices were distressed by the Court's acceptance of this
principle. Id. at 382.
At least one appellate court has allowed the issue to be submitted to the jury with
considerable reluctance.
We think it requires but little reflection to convince that the difficulties in giving
effect to the public policy upon which the miscalled "defense" of entrapment is
based would lessen considerably, if the matter were withdrawn as a fact question for
the jury and consigned to the "supervisory authority over the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts."
Robison v. United States, 379 F.2d 338, 346 (9th Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 390 U.S.
198 (1968).
See DeFeo, supra note 5, at 270-71. Mr. Michael DeFeo gives three reasons for
submitting the issue to the jury. He first notes that the defense involves close questions of
fact turning on the credibility of witnesses, thus placing it particularly within the competence
of the jury. Second, Defeo observes that under the majority view, determination of the
defendant's motive and intent requires the collective judgment of the jury as to the
reasonable man. Finally, he states that juries express community standards, acquitting
whenever police practices shake the common conscience regardless of legal technicalities. Id.
at 270.
However, the very closeness of questions turning on credibility makes even the most
minimal prejudice of the jury doubly important. The judge may be the better party to
impartially view the question. See notes 42 & 43 infra. Second, a reasonable man test is not
really involved, even under the majority approach. Instead, the majority test focuses on a
particular defendant in a particular set of circumstances. See note 33 supra. The minority test
logically places this standard within the purview of the court as a matter of law, giving rise to
more uniformity in application. See note 41 iftfra.
41 See 356 U.S. at 384. A series of court decisions based on a reasonable man standard
would help define guidelines for police by defining particular types of behavior as either
acceptable or unacceptable. Over a period of time, some certainty could be injected into the
area.
42 Id. at 382 (Frankfurter J., concurring); see 36 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 227-32 (1959).
Under the majority approach, once the defendant has raised the issue of entrapment his
record and reputation are admissible as evidence of predisposition. 356 U.S. at 373-75. This
rule places the defendant in the difficult position of either not raising the defense at all or
risking the prejudicial effect that evidence of his past character will have upon the jury. See
note 74 infra. Although juries have been thought to be particularly competent in assessing
the veracity of a defendant's or an informer's conflicting testimony as to the actual conduct
of the government in a given case, it is likely that the past character of the defendant will
tinge the jury's judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Harrell, 458 F.2d 655 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972); United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1966).
A field study has revealed that concern for the prejudicial effect of a prior record on a
jury is well founded.
The jury's broad rule of thumb here, presumably, is that as a matter of human
experience it is especially unlikely that a person with no prior record will commit a
serious crime, and that this is relevant to evaluating his testimony when he denies
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submission of the defense to the jury has generated substantial
confusion in the courts. The various circuits have shuffled and
reshuffled the burden of proof and statements of the issues in an
attempt to simplify the law for adequate jury consideration. 43 By
his guilt on the stand. As to him, the presumption of innocence has special torce. In
contrast, defendants with records.., evoke a different jury calculus of probabilities
H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 179 (1966); cf. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.4, Comment
(Tentative Draft 1968). See also H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, supra, at 121-33.
It might be argued that problematic government conduct would also have a psychologi-
cal impact on the jury, counterbalancing the effect of the defendant's record. However, one
example of a situation in which possible jury prejudice may have exonerated questionable
law-enforcement activities is United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1972). The
defendant in Silver claimed entrapment and took the stand to testify.
He said he made these [illegal drug] sales only because the two informers had
importuned him to do so, and had described agents Cassidy and Miller as members
of the "Mafia" who would kill them [the two informers], Silver, his girlfriend
co-defendant D'Angelo, his pet goat, rooster, three dogs and three cats, should
Silver fail to sell the agents cocaine.
Id. at 1218. Although the court overturned Silver's conviction on the basis of improper jury
instructions relating to the consequences of probable cause of the government to solicit him,
the jury, when left to consider the credibility of the defendant'with regard to predisposition,
convicted him in the face of a seemingly clear pattern of reprehensible government conduct.
One commentator succinctly states the problem as follows:
However bad a person may be, however guilty of crime, it is nevertheless a principle
of our system of criminal law administration that conviction and punishment must
be for some specific act or crime proved against an accused by competent evidence
compelling an inference of guilt as to the specific act, and not for a general criminal
depravity or wickedness. The admission of this kind of evidence invariably pre-
judices the jury against the accused and diverts their attention from an impartial
consideration of the evidence of the particular crime charged. It is difficult to justify
the injection into a trial ... [of] hearsay complaints or [an] officer's suspicions about
other offenses. And even if proved, prior transgressions do not compel a logical
inference that the defendant did in fact commit the particular offense.
Donnelly, supra notes 5, at 1108.
In United States v. Morrision, 348 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965),
the court expressed fears as to potential jury prejudice.
Because d6fendants may be seriously prejudiced by the introduction, even
though proper, of evidence bearing on their past criminal offenses, careful instruc-
tions are appropriate to limit the degree of the prejudice. The principal danger,
however, is that the government will introduce the evidence and that the jury will
take it as proof of guilt.
Id. at 1005.
13 A good example of this process comes from the First Circuit. In Gorin v. United
States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963), the court held that a
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was induced to commit
the offense. The burden then shifts to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense. In Waker v. United States, 344
F.2d 795 (lst Cir. 1965), the court noted:
We have concluded that although, strictly, an element of the offense is not involved,
it would be unduly confusing to instruct the jury that the government's burden is
any the less on this issue than it is on other parts of its case.
Id. at 796 n.3.
A year later, in Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
816 (1966), the court again grappled with the problem of the burden of proof.
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leaving the decision to the court as a matter of law, the minority
approach would resolve most of these difficulties.
44
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Sherman, felt that the Sorrells
majority was posing a "false choice" when it declared that either the
defendant's conduct must fall outside of the statute or he must be
convicted. 45 The concurring opinions found the defendant guilty
within the terms of the statute, but absolved him of liability in
response to the courts' duty to control police conduct while over-
seeing the fair administration of justice.46 In the same vein, Justice
Roberts had written:
However, since our decision in Gorin, we have noticed and commented upon the
confusion apt to be generated in a jury's mind by having to apply two measures of
the burden of proof in the same case.... Upon further consideration, we think that
this difficulty calls for resolution. The solution that we propose is to reduce the
burden which we have previously placed on the defendant from a burden of
persuasion to a mere burden of coming forward with evidence. This we do, not
because our view of the doctrine of entrapment has changed, but in order to
simplify the problems of the jury and, possibly, of the charging judge.
Id. at 202-03. Compare United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1966). See Orfield, The
Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DuKE L.J. 39, 68-71 (discusses problem and
reviews varying solutions of different courts of appeals).
44 A decision as a matter of law is also consistent with the minority emphasis on judicial
responsibility for policing the purity of the courts. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text
infra. The Model Penal Code, adopting the minority approach provides:
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a person prosecuted for
an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his
conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be
tried by the Court in the absence of the jury.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
This approach seems to be a sensible way to allocate the burden of proof. The need for
government proof of predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt (see note 43 supra) is ended
with the elimination of jury consideration and the substitution of an "average" man
standard. A preponderance of the evidence test, rather than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, seems sufficient when government conduct rather than the defendant's guilt becomes
the focus of attention.
45 356 U.S. at 381.
46 Justice Frankfurter clearly articulated the importance of the distinctions between the
majority and minority approaches in Sherman.
It might be thought that it is largely an academic question whether the court's
finding a bar to conviction derives from the statute or from a supervisory jurisdic-
tion over the administration of criminal justice; under either theory substantially
the same considerations will determine whether the defense of entrapment is
sustained. But to look to a statute for guidance in the application of a policy not
remotely within the contemplation of Congress at the time of its enactment is to
distort analysis. It is to run the risk, furthermore, that the court will shirk the
responsibility that is necessarily in its keeping, if Congress is truly silent, to
accommodate the dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civilized methods
adequate to counter the ingenuity of modern criminals. The reasons that actually
underlie the defense of entrapment can too easily be lost sight of in the pursuit of a
wholly fictitious congressional intent.
Id. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
It seems clear that the federal courts may have some powers, short of constitutional
ones, to police the purity of the system. Those powers were articulated in McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-47 (1943).
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The protection of its own functions and the preservation of the
purity of its own temple belongs only to the court. It is the
province of the court and of the court alone to protect itself and
the government from such prostitution of the criminal law. 47
The concurring justices noted that defendants in entrapment cases
fall directly within the wording of criminal statutes because they
perform all of the essential acts of the crime. Once induced to
participate, defendants knowingly do so, thus satisfying the mens
rea requirement of the criminal law. 48 Under the majority ap-
proach, moreover, it seems clear that a legislature could expressly
abolish the defense if it chose to do so;4 9 however, under the
The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single function-
ary. The complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different
parts, responsibility for which is separately vested in the various participants upon
whom the criminal law relies for its vindication ...
... We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as
courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement. We hold only that a
decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of justice and custodians of liberty
forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence secured under the circum-
stances revealed here.
Without reaching the level of constitutional protections, individuals are protected by the
power of the courts to police law enforcement activities. This power rests in the judiciary's
function of ratifying the activities of law enforcement agencies. If the court imposes
punishment on one convicted of a crime, it in effect ratifies the earlier activities of the
policeman in detecting what appeared to be a crime. But the courts should not allow
themselves to be used as instruments to ratify the wrongs of other governmental bodies, or
justice and respect for the law will suffer.
"' Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932).
48 Id. at 456-57. Logically the majority's rationale could extend to innocent persons
lured into crime by third parties unrelated to the government, circumstances under which
the defense has never been held to apply. See Gonzales v. United States, 251 F.2d 298, 299
(9th Cir. 1958); Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1956). See generally
Note, Entrapment: An Analysis of Disagreement, supra note 5, at 560-65.
Under the minority approach, the defendant is freed only because of abhorrent police
practices, not because he is any less guilty of a crime than would be a compatriot lured into
the activity by third persons.
Compare Mikell, supra note 9, at 264, with Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The
Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942, 946 (1965). See generally
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 218 (1967).
41 To construe statutes so as to avoid absurd or glaringly unjust results, foreign to
the legislative purpose, is, as we have seen, a traditional and appropriate function of
the courts. Judicial nullification of statutes, admittedly valid and applicable, has,
happily, no place in our system. The Congress by legislation can always, if it desires,
alter the effect of judicial construction of statutes. We conceive it to be our duty to
construe the statute here in question reasonably, and we hold that it is beyond our
prerogative to give the statute an unreasonable construction, confessedly contrary to
public policy, and then to decline to enforce it.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 (1932) (emphasis added).
The Court in Sorrells relied on "public policy" to determine the reasonableness of a
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minority approach the defense exists to rectify police practices
which cannot be tolerated.
The Court, in Sherman, did not foreclose the possibility that the
minority view might at some time be reconsidered as the doctrinal
foundation of entrapment. 50 By 1973, most circuits had at least
implicitly embraced the minority approach in cases of truly rep-
rehensible police conduct.51 A succinct formulation of the objective
approach, which the Court could adopt, had been enunciated by
Judge Traynor: "[T]he line must be drawn between methods likely
to persuade those unwilling to commit an offense from methods
likely to persuade only those who are ready to do so. '152 The stage
was thus set for reconsideration of the defense.
III
United States v. Russell
In 1973, the Supreme Court agreed to reconsider the entrap-
ment issue in United States v. Russell,53 a case involving a defendant
with an admitted predisposition toward criminal activity. 54 In Rus-
sell, a government agent visited the defendant's home claiming to
represent an organization interested in controlling the illegal man-
ufacture and distribution of methamphetamine ("speed"). The
agent offered to supply Russell and his codefendants with an
essential and difficult to obtain ingredient 55 in the drug's manufac-
ture, phenyl-two-propanone, in return for one-half of the drug
statutory construction. If the legislature clearly worded a statute so as to preclude such a
construction, the Court world, in its sense of justice, be driven to find a new vehicle by which
to uphold the public policy. Cf. Comment, Due Process of Law and the Entrapment Defense, 1964
U. ILL. L.F. 821, 822-23.
50 Chief Justice Warren wrote:
It has been suggested that in overturning this conviction we should reassess the
doctrine of entrapment according to principles announced in the separate opinion
of Mr. Justice Roberts in Sorrells .... To do so would be to decide the case on
grounds rejected by the majority in Sorrells and, so far as the record shows, not
raised here or below by the parties.
356 U.S. at 376.
In a later case, the Supreme Court did look at police conduct as well as the overwhelm-
ing evidence of predisposition. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1963).
Unfortunately, in Lopez the Court blindly quoted Sherman and did not carefully articulate the
rationale of its decision.
5 See notes 75-81 infra.
52 People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 765,463 P.2d 763, 769, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411,417 (1970)
(Traynor, J., dissenting).
53 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
54 Id. at 425.
55 Id. at 426.
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produced. The offer was conditioned upon the agent being given a
sample of the drug and being taken to the laboratory where it was
already being produced in a small ongoing operation.56 After the
conditions were satisfied, a business arrangement was consum-
mated with the agent actually supplying the chemical and, in
return, receiving half the final product. When the defendants were
finally arrested, a search of the laboratory revealed phenyl-two-
propanone acquired from nongovernment sources, demonstrating
that the defendants were able to and did acquire the chemical from
sources other than the agent during the period of their
agreement.
57
The circuit court, on these facts, reversed the district court and
found that Russell had been entrapped. 58 The sole basis for the
reversal was that the government had supplied an essential element
in the drug's manufacture.5 9 As a matter of law, the circuit court
concluded that "a defense to a criminal charge may be founded
upon an intolerable degree of government participation in the
criminal enterprise. "60
56 Id. at 425.
57 Id. at 426. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the government agent saw an empty
phenyl-two-propanone bottle on his first visit to the laboratory where Russell worked. He
further noted that when the laboratory was searched after the defendant's arrest, two more
bottles of the chemical (not supplied by the agent) were confiscated. Id.
" United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). The
opinion of the district court is not officially reported.
59 Id. at 672. The court of appeals's interpretation of the facts differed from that of the
Supreme Court. Judge Ely, writing for the court of appeals, was of the opinion that the
phenyl-two-propanone was more difficult to obtain than Justice Rehnquist had portrayed it.
Judge Ely summarized: "Thus, there could not have been the manufacture, delivery, or sale
of the illegal drug had it not been for the Government's supply of one of the essential
ingredients." Id. Judge Ely may have thus portrayed the facts in an attempt to cast his
opinion, which was a departure from the traditional majority approach, in a more favorable
light.
Justice Stewart, writing for the Russell dissenters, also dealt with the Rehnquist finding
that the defendant could have obtained the phenyl-two-propanone without government
intervention. He first noted that the hard-to-obtain chemical used in the batch of metham-
phetamine for which the defendant was actually arrested was supplied by the government.
411 U.S. at 447. The dissent then questioned why the agent did not simply purchase the
drugs after their manufacture, rather than supplying the vital ingredient, if the chemical
could have been so easily procured. Id. at 448-49. With this doubt in mind, Justice Stewart
found entrapment as a matter of law because the government had solved Russell's practical
production problems. Id. at 449.
60 459 F.2d at 673. The court of appeals advanced two alternative theories for relieving
the defendant of liability-a government involvement test found within the traditional
entrapment framework and a creative activity test derived from outside of entrapment
doctrine. Under the first test, the court concluded that, regardless of the significance of
predisposition, a defense could be founded upon an "intolerable degree of governmental
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Admittedly predisposed toward commission of the offense,
Russell, by definition, could not come within the majority entrap-
ment doctrine. Therefore, he argued that the Supreme Court
should redefine the entrapment doctrine enunciated in Sorrells and
Sherman. His principal argument, not previously raised in the
Supreme Court, was that entrapment should rest on constitutional
participation in the criminal enterprise." Id. Judge Ely attempted to tie the case to traditional
entrapment notions by finding the facts to be indistinguishable from those in United States
v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), and those in United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp.
1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970). In both of these prior cases, the government had supplied the
defendant with the contraband for which he was arrested. 447 F.2d at 904-05; 312 F. Supp.
at 1308-09. Relying, without comment, upon the Bueno and Chisum reasoning, Judge Ely
somewhat broadened traditional doctrine to find entrapment based on a test of whether the
defendant would have been "powerless to 'commit' the charged offenses without the
Government's pervasive intervention." 459 F.2d at 673.
The foundations of this theory are somewhat unclear. The Bueno opinion did not
greatly clarify the problem because Judge Roney merely noted that the entrapment doctrine
had undergone such "maturation" that it could include government supply of contraband.
447 F.2d at 906. This holding is consistent with the Sorrells statement that the government
cannot punish for offenses which are the "product of the creative activity of its own
officials." 287 U.S. at 451. But the Bueno holding ignores the other half of the creative
activity test, that the person induced be "otherwise innocent," i.e., not predisposed. Id.
Judge Ferguson's opinion in Chisum is somewhat more helpful. The opinion found it
unnecessary to choose the Frankfurter approach, in part because of Chief Justice Warren's
statement that the law enforcement function "does not include the manufacturing of crime."
312 F. Supp. at 1311. Judge Ferguson's basic thrust, however, was that a high degree of
government involvement in a crime gives the defendant a due process defense. For a further
discussion of this due process defense, see notes 87-100 infra. However, the Chisum ap-
proach, like that in Bueno, cannot be fully reconciled with the traditional majority doctrine
because it avoids predisposition.
Perhaps because of the problems of fitting the government involvement test within the
traditional majority framework, which requires looking to predisposition, Judge Ely ad-
vanced the second Russell theory. It was based upon the opinion in Greene v. United States,
454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971), a case in which a government agent initiated, encouraged,
aided, and sometimes directed a whiskey bootlegging scheme. id. at 784-86. As in Russell, the
defendants were clearly predisposed to commit the crime. Id. at 786. The Greene court
theorized that since the usual defense was unavailable, a special one would have to be
adopted. The new defense rested on the unwillingness of the court to allow "the Govern-
ment ... [to] involve itself so directly and continuously and over such a long period of time
in the creation and maintenance of criminal operations) and yet prosecute its collaborators."
Id. at 787. The decision then stated that the same objections that underlay the entrapment
defense were operative in the case at bar, and the defendant had to be freed. Id.
Judge Ely, in Russell, found the government conduct to be "equally repugnant, if not
more so" than the conduct in Greene. 459 F.2d at 674. In the Russell summary, the court of
appeals drifted still further from the majority approach, opening the door even wider for
Supreme Court consideration of the case. The opinion first conceded that the only differ-
ence between its alternative theories was "the label affixed to the result." Id. Either thesis
would be appropriate because both were premised on the same concepts of fundamental due
process and reluctance of the judiciary to countenance "overzealous law enforcement." Id.
These two concepts are the very ones to which the Supreme Court had earlier refused to
grant credence.
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grounds. 6' As an alternative, he urged that the Sherman-Sorrells
minority approach be accepted. 2
In urging a constitutional basis for the defense, Russell argued
that the government's involvement in the manufacture of the drug
was so great that it would violate the principles of due process to
prosecute him for its manufacture.6 3 He suggested adoption of a
rule absolutely precluding prosecution whenever it was shown that
the criminal conduct "would not have been possible had not an
undercover agent 'supplied an indispensable means to the commis-
sion of the crime that could not have been obtained otherwise,
through legal or illegal channels.' "64 Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the five-man majority,65 disposed of this argument by noting that,
aside from other difficulties,6 6 Russell could not fit within the
confines of his own proposed test because the phenyl-two-
61 411 U.S. at 430. Some commentators have argued for constitutionalization of the
defense. See Note, The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Standards, supra note 5,
at 67; Comment, supra note 49, at 821-27; Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next
Move--Due Process?, 1971 UTAH L. REv. 266, 272.
Professor Lester Orfield has argued that the statutory construction sanctioned by the
majority view carries within itself some constitutional overtones:
In construing a statute as not encompassing acts committed as a result of entrap-
ment as the Court did in Sorrells and Sherman, it is arguable that the Court was
employing an established rule of statutory construction; namely, statutes are to be
construed so as to avoid running afoul of constitutional safeguards. E.g., Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). Thus it is possible that constitutional guarantees
chart the permissible limits, albeit amorphous, of government conduct amounting
to entrapment.
Orfield, supra note 43, at 56 n.104.
62 411 U.S. at 432-33.
63 Id. at 430.
64 Id. at 431.
65 Five justices joined in the decision while four dissented. Agreeing with Justice
Rehnquist were Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell. Dissenting
were Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall.
66 Justice Rehnquist noted that a strict exclusionary rule, similar to the ones used in
cases of faulty confessions and illegal searches and seizures, would be inapplicable to
entrapment activity because in the latter no independent constitutional right or federal
statute is involved. He .further indicated his disapproval of an attempt to embody the
entrapment doctrine itself in a fixed constitutional rule in order to provide an independent
right. 411 U.S. at 430-31.
Some commentators have argued that an analogy can be made between entrapment and
unlawful searches and seizures, thus placing defendants within the protection of the fourth
amendment. See Note, The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Standards, supra note
5, at 73-76. However, the analogy between gathering evidence and gathering information on
or promoting criminal acts of defendants seems strained. Moreover, fourth amendment
protections have heretofore been extended only to physical zones, and it seems unnecessary
that the Supreme Court should strain to expand its analysis, if at all, when a due process
claim is more readily available. See Note, supra note 5, at 73-76.
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propanone had in fact been obtained from sources other than the
agent.
67
Having refused to accept a defense of entrapment based upon
constitutional grounds, Justice Rehnquist addressed himself to the
respondent's alternative argument and specifically rejected the
police-conduct approach to entrapment. 68 He first acknowledged
the theoretical and practical criticisms of the old approach, but
dismissed them perfunctorily saying that "[a]rguments such as
these, while not devoid of appeal, have been twice previously made
to this Court and twice rejected -by it. ... -69 The opinion went on
to reaffirm the congressional intent theory,70 noting that Congress
might address itself to the question at any time it so desired.71
Justice Rehnquist finally restated Chief Justice Warren's fear in
Sherman that the government might never obtain convictions under
the police-conduct approach.7 2
The dissent, while not addressing itself to Russell's constitu-
tional arguments, 73 did argue strenuously for the adoption of the
67 See, e.g., note 59 and accompanying text supra.
68 411 U.S. at 431-32.
I6 d. at 433-34. Some confusion in terminology has been added by United States v.
Russell. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, criticized the court of appeals's "police
participation" test as introducing "an unmanageably subjective standard which is contrary to
the holdings of this Court in Sorrells and Sherman." Id. at 435 (emphasis added). Justice
Rehnquist's remark seems directly contrary to traditional definitions of "subjective" and
"objective" in this area. See note 33 supra. However, Justice Rehnquist's label is explicable if it
is assumed that he was considering the application of the tests rather than the results of a
particular case. Under his approach, the majority test is an objective, mechanical one in
which chiefly predisposition need be questioned. On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist
characterized the minority view as subjective because it allows the court to strike down
conduct which the court feels, is wrong. Traditionally, however, the majority approach has
been thought of as subjective because it focuses on the predisposition of the defendant, and
when applied, it leads to different results, in cases involving ideptical police conduct. Under
the minority view, the subjective element of the defendant's predisposition is not injected
into the analysis, and cases involving the same type of police conduct would be decided the
sz1me.
70 411 U.S. at 433.
71 Id. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
72 411 U.S. at 434. But see note 35 supra.
Justice Rehnquist's predilections are clear from Russell dictum.
Nor does it seem particularly desirable for the law to grant complete immunity
from prosecution to one who himself planned to commit a crime, and then
committed it, simply because government undercover agents subjected him to
inducements which might have seduced a hypothetical individual who was not so
predisposed.
411 U.S. at 434.
73 Presumably, the dissenters believed that they offered a preferable alternative to
constitutionalizing the defense in the form of the police-conduct approach. The limited
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police-conduct approach to entrapment.74 Nevertheless, the possi-
bility, left open in Sherman, that the police-conduct theory might in
the future be adopted by the Supreme Court was clearly foreclosed
by Russell.
IV
THE AFTERMATH-REMAINING QUESTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Before the Russell decision, the courts of appeals had experi-
enced difficulty in reconciling the majority approach with their
sense of justice in cases of particularly reprehensible police conduct
coupled with a predisposed defendant. 75 The solutions devised
varied from circuit to circuit. They included: (1) adopting outright
constitutional approach as portrayed in the Russell majority dictum would have many of the
same disadvantages of the old majority view. See note 99 and accompanying text infra.
One commentator has noted that due process avoids "major infirmities associated with
application of the older tests." 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 127, 132 (1971). However, the infirmities
mentioned included distraction from a proper examination of police behavior caused by
admission of evidence concerning predisposition, unequal results from identical police
behavior, and logical inconsistencies in the statutory intent rationale. Id. at 132-33. These
infirmities are merely those commonly associated with the majority view. No satisfactory
rationale is given for preferring due process over the minority approach which also
eliminates the aforementioned infirmities.
The preceding observations came in the context of an argument that United States v.
Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970), relied on the due process clause. A serious
problem arises, however, with reliance on the Chisum decision as a mandate for due process
analysis. The decision cited Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), as a Supreme Court decision
placing entrapment within the due process clause. However, the Raley fact pattern was
different from those in which entrapment is normally thought to occur. Raley held that
conviction of a person for refusing to answer questions before an Ohio Un-American
Activities Commission, when the Commission led the person to believe he could permissibly
invoke the right against self-incrimination, violated due process. Id. The Chisum court
provided no rationale for due process which differs from traditional concepts followed by
the Supreme Court and courts of appeals as they apply the majority and minority tests.
74 411 U.S. at 440-50. Justice Stewart, writing for the Russell dissenters, followed closely
the Roberts and Frankfurter lines of reasoning from Sorrells and Sherman. Id. Justice Stewart
did, however, discuss the evidentiary problems involved in the old majority approach.
Moreover, a test that makes the entrapment defense depend on... predisposition
permits the introduction into evidence of all kinds of hearsay, suspicion, and
rumor-all of which would be inadmissible in any other context-in order to prove
the defendant's predisposition. It allows the prosecution . . . to rely on the
defendant's bad reputation or past criminal activities, including even rumored
activities of which the prosecution may have insufficient evidence to obtain an
indictment .... This sort of evidence is not only unreliable, as the hearsay rule
recognizes; but it is also highly prejudicial, especially if the matter is submitted to
the jury, for, despite instructions to the contrary, the jury may well consider such
evidence as probative not simply of the defendant's predisposition, but of his guilt
of the offense with which he stands charged.
Id. at 443. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
7' See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423
(1973); notes 76-81 and accompanying text infra.
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the minority approach,7 6 (2) interpreting the majority view to allow
application of an alternative test, either predisposition or police
conduct,77 (3) distinguishing between predisposition at different
points in time during a criminal enterprise, 8 (4) adopting a con-
stitutional basis for the defense,79 (5) creating a new defense
outside the entrapment framework, 0 and (6) defining predisposi-
tion away in cases of extreme police conduct. 8
7' See United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027, 1030-31 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated, 412
U.S. 936 (1973); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 950 (1965). The future use of the minority approach is clearly foreclosed by Russell.
77 See United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 393-94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989
(1971); United States v. Morrison, 348 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905
(1965); Waker v. United States, 344 F.2d 795, 796 (1st Cir. 1965); Whiting v. United States,
321 F.2d 72, 76 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963); Walker v. United States, 285 F.2d
52, 56 (5th Cir. 1960); Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 883 (1958); Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993, 994 (5th Cir. 1933). The courts writing
these opinions were in effect taking the minority approach which allows police conduct as an
independent test because the majority approach requires conviction of a predisposed
defendant. Russell stands as a clear warning to the lower courts not to use an alternative test.
78 See United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1957). The court found
the defendant entrapped after he formulated a detailed plan for criminal activity, but
abandoned it of his own accord. After repeated urging by government agents, the plan was
subsequently carried through. It would appear that Russell does not expressly negate the
possibility of using this approach.
7' See United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423
(1973); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (C.D. Cal. 1970). These courts
suggested analogies to search and seizure cases, as well as due process, as the proper
foundation for the defense. Due process was specifically found not to be the basis of
entrapment defenses by the Russell court. See notes 84-98 and accompanying text infra.
80 See Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971). For a complete
discussion of the case, see note 60 supra.
The problem with this approach is that it in fact constitutes entrapment as it has been
traditionally known with only a new label to distinguish it. The lower court in Russell had
argued for such a defense as an alternative to its use of the minority entrapment approach.
See note 60 supra. By reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court gave a strong warning
of its disapproval of such tactics.
s See Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 373 (Ist Cir. 1967). See also United States v.
Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971). For a further discussion of the Bueno opinion, see
note 60 supra. These courts refused to even discuss the issue of predisposition finding that
extreme police conduct creates a reasonable doubt that the defendant was ready and willing
to commit the crime when approached.
At the other end of the spectrum, it is argued that extreme forms of induce-
ment are socially offensive.... We see no purpose in debating the wisdom of such a
principle, for there is a more ready answer. Extreme police tactics ... will mean that
as a matter of law the government cannot be found to have sustained its burden of
proving that it did not corrupt an innocent or unwilling man .... No situation
suggests itself in which such police behavior, if conceded or found, would not
necessarily create a reasonable doubt that the defendant was ready and willing to
commit the crime when he was approached.
Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 373 (Ist Cir. 1967).
The future use of this solution has the inherent weakness of failure to even consider
predisposition, when the Russell opinion ordains that a predisposition test be followed.
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The court, in Russell, noted that several federal court decisions
had gone beyond the entrapment doctrine enunciated in Sorrells
and Sherman.s2 The Russell majority warned the lower courts
against using the entrapment defense as a "chancellor's foot" veto
to strike down what they considered to be objectionable law en-
forcement practices.83 Instead, the court directed that entrapment,
as defined in Sorrells and Sherman, be used as a relatively limited
defense.
8 4
It is rooted not in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss
prosecutions for what it feels to have been "overzealous law
enforcement," but instead in the notion that Congress could not
have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has
committed all the elements of a prescribed offense, but was
induced to commit them by the government.
8 5
Although an admission or finding of predisposition is now
clearly fatal to a claim of entrapment, 6 the Court in Russell
indicated to the lower federal courts a possible means of barring
prosecution of a predisposed defendant. While refusing to rest
entrapment on constitutional grounds, the Russell majority, in
dictum, did recognize the possibility of some day being faced with a
predisposed defendant whose arrest resulted, not in entrapment,
but in a violation of the due process clause. 7 Such a situation
would occur if the government's conduct rises above "overzealous
law enforcement" to a level which is so outrageous that it shocks
the conscience.
88
Russell, while using such traditional due process language as
" 'shocking to the universal sense of justice' " and violative of
" 'fundamental fairness,' ''89 did proffer some concrete guidelines
as to the type of police conduct which would be objectionable. The
opinion points to three elements which should be weighed in
determining whether due process has been violated in obtaining
the conviction of a predisposed defendant: (1) the stage of the
criminal activity, i.e., whether or not it was already in process, (2)
However, in cases of extreme police conduct, the same result may now be reached under a
due process standard. See notes 87-88 and accompanying text infra.




86 Id. at 436.
87 Id. at 431-32.




the element supplied by the government, and (3) the extent of
government involvement."
Of the three, the first element appears to carry the most
weight. The agent's contribution of propanone in Russell was
termed "scarcely objectionable" on the ground that the criminal
enterprise was already in progress.91 Furthermore, speaking gen-
erally of infiltration into drug rings, the court noted that "[t]he
illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident,
but a continuing, though illegal, business enterprise."1192 Therefore, one
may assume that many forms of police conduct which would be
objectionable if carried on in connection with a predisposed indi-
vidual not yet engaged in crime could pass constitutional muster in
the presence of an ongoing criminal activity.
The element, if any, supplied by the government also is
important. In Russell, it was pointed out that propanone, by itself,
was a harmless substance whose possession was legal. 3 In addition,
although difficult to obtain, it was nevertheless obtainable.9 4 The
definite impression left is that supplying some element which is
dangerous, illegal, and most important, nearly impossible to obtain
may be grounds for barring prosecution. However, the element
supplied must be considered in conjunction with whether the
criminal activity is an ongoing enterprise or an isolated incident. In
its drug ring example, the Court made it clear that "the supply
of some item of value that the drug ring requires must, as a general
rule, also be permissible."95 Although the element supplied to an
ongoing enterprise, by definition, could not be impossible to ob-
tain, once again, greater leeway seems permissible when the crimi-
nal activity is already in progress.
The final element, the extent of government involvement, also
appears to be an important focal point for purposes of due process.
In Russell it was pointed out that the agent, aside from one minor
incident, did not participate or direct any of the work in the
manufacture of the drug. 6 Even in his drug ring example, Justice
Rehnquist referred to "limited" participation of government
agents.97 The Court also quoted with approval the Sherman phrase,
'o See notes 91-98 and accompanying text infra.
9 411 U.S. at 432.
9 2 Id. (emphasis added).
93 Id.
14 See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
15 411 U.S. at 432.
96 Id. at 426 n.3.
17 Id. at 432. The Rehnquist "limited participation" requirement seems to provide a
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"[m]anifestly, [the law enforcement] function does not include the
manufacturing of crime."' 8 A due process defense would thus
appear available when government agents take an all-pervasive
part in participating in or in guiding a criminal enterprise. Again,
in the case of an ongoing, organized operation, law enforcement
officials are not likely to "manufacture" the crime, but in the case
of an individual incident, government conduct is more likely to
extend beyond permissible bounds.
Although the majority entrapment-due process approach is an
improvement over a strict predisposition standard, in that prosecu-
tion may still be barred in cases of extremely objectionable police
conduct even when coupled with predisposed defendants, the
improvement is minimal.99 Although the new entrapment-due pro-
cess approach may reach the same result as the police-conduct
entrapment approach in the face of especially shocking police
conduct, the vast majority of objectionable police conduct used to
ensnare a predisposed defendant probably cannot rise to a level
which would violate due process. Thus, most defendants will still
have to show lack of predisposition to make out the defense. The
Court's view of entrapment remains antithetical to the philosophy
expressed by Justice Frankfurter:
No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclina-
tions to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the
defense in cases in which the government supplies an otherwise unavailable ingredient or is
deeply involved in the perpetration of the crime-cases in which lower courts have found
police activity to be unconscionable. Cf United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir.
1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 936 (1973); United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972);
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903
(5th Cir. 1971); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967); Williamson v. United
States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965); Walker v. United
States, 285 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191 (3d Cir.
1957).
98 411 U.S. at 434.
99 The due process test could also lead to inequalities under the law not present in the
minority test because due process would seemingly consider the police conduct in the
context of predisposition. Thus, the individual's prior conduct, unrelated to the crime at
hand, may well determine the degree .of police conduct allowed. Moreover, -in all but the
small number of especially objectionable cases in which due process may be used, the old
majority approach with its jury prejudice and theoretical inconsistency still prevails. Finally,
the very limited use of due process as outlined by the Russell opinion will lack the degree of
predictability of the Frankfurter minority approach. Although more guidelines on the outer
limits of police behavior will be available through precedent than were available under the




estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into
further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society. 100
In declining to overturn long-standing precedent, the Russell
majority specifically noted the possibility of congressional action.1 1
Specific legislation has been proposed by the American Law Insti-
tute in section 2.13 of the Model Penal Code'0 2 and by the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws in section 702 of
the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code.' 0 3 Both proposed sta-
tutes opt for the police-conduct approach to the entrapment
defense.'0 4 The Proposed Federal Code explicitly enunciates an
objective "law-abiding persons" standard against which law en-
forcement activities are to be measured. The Model Penal Code
also employs a "persons" standard rather than testing conduct
against a particular defendant. The strengths of the Model Code
are its explicit requirement that the defense be decided as a matter
of law and its clarification of the placement of the burden of
100 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
101 411 U.S. at 433.
102 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
103 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT: A
PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE 58 (1971).
104 The Model Penal Code formulates the entrapment defense as follows:
Section 2.13 Entrapment.
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation With
such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence
of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to
engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief
that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a sub-
stantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who
are ready to commit it.
(3) The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution
is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The proposed Federal Criminal
Code provides:
§ 702. Entrapment.
(1). Affirmative Defense. It is an affirmative defense that the defendant was
entrapped into committing the offense.
(2) Entrapment Defined. Entrapment occurs when,a law enforcement agent induces
the commission of an offense, using persuasion or other means likely to cause
normally law-abiding persons to commit the offense. Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(3) Law Enforcement Agent Defined. In this section "law enforcement agent"
includes personnel of state and local law enforcement agencies as well as of the
United States, and any person cooperating with such an agency.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 103, at 58.
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proof,'0 5 as well as its greater specificity of proscribed conduct. 0 6
Either code would be a viable alternative which would eliminate the
weaknesses in the Sorrells-Sherman-Russell majority approach by
adopting the Sorrells-Sherman concurring and the Russell dissenting
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overturn its prior decisions, the time has arrived for appropriate
congressional action.' 07
CONCLUSION
The Russell opinion embodies the same infirmities found in the
Sherman and Sorrells majority opinions. 08 The theoretical founda-
tion for the majority approach is illogical and open to inconsisten-
cies in the event of congressional action.' 0 9 Moreover, practical
concerns" 0° and problems of equality under the law"' militate
against acceptance of the traditional entrapment framework. The
due process safeguard left open by the Russell majority has only
limited applicability." 2 Viable legislative alternatives, embodying
the minority, police-conduct approach to entrapment have been
proposed, ' 3 and their enactment is required in order to correct
the injustices which the majority approach entails.
Mr. Justice Holmes, several years before the Supreme Court
decided Sorrells, provided a thought which should be the touch-
stone of courts and legislatures considering the entrapment de-
fense. "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the Government should play an ignoble part."
'" 4
Beth Ela
,05 For the text of the Model Penal Code relating to jury submission and burden of
proof, see note 44 supra. The Comment to § 702 of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code
notes that entrapment as a bar to prosecution is removed from jury consideration. As an
affirmative defense, entrapment would have to be established by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence. NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
supra note 103, at 58.
106 See note 104 supra.
107 Two bills are currently pending before Congress which contemplate statutory
formulations of the defense. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973).
108 See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
109 See notes 45-49 and accompanying text supa.
110 See notes 40-44 and accompanying text supra.
"I See notes 31-39 and accompanying text supra.
112 See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
113 See notes 102-07 and accompanying text supra.
114 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
